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Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India: An 
Irreconcilable Interpretation of Section 4 of the 
Clayton Act as Applied to Sovereign Foreigns. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In January 1978, the Supreme Court decided the case of Pfizer, Inc. v. 
Government of India! (hereinafter PfIZer). The Court had the opportunity, for the 
first time, to consider the question of whether a foreign government is entitled 
to bring a treble damages action under section 4 of the Clayton Act. 2 The 
rellolution of this issue rested on the determination of a foreign government's 
status as a 'person' within the meaning of section 4 of the Clayton Act. By 
1. 434 U.S. 308 (1978). Although a number of articles have already been written on the Pfizer 
decision, only one has critically examined the opinion with respect to the statutory interpretation 
of section 4 of the Clayton Act and this was done by counsel for the Philippines. See Houser and 
Rigler, Antitrust and the Foreign Government Trader: The Impact of Pfizer, Inc. v. GoVtrmmt of India, 10 
LAW &: POL'Y INT'L Bus. 719 (1978). The remaining articles merely regurgitate the background 
and holding of Pfizer and only occasionally do they even mention the analytical prob-
lems with the Court's decision. See, e.g., Note, Antitrust - Treble Damages - A Foreign Sovereign is a 
Person Entitled to Sue Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 10 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 333 (1978); Note, 
Private Actions by Foreign Governments Under the U.S. Antitrust Laws, 10 LAW. AM. 609 (1978); Recent 
Development, Antitrust: Standingfor Foreign Governments - PfIZer, Inc. v. Gov't of India, 434 u.s. 308 
(1978), 10 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 833 (1978); Recent Decisions, Antitrust - Standing to Sue - A 
Foreign Nation Otherwise Entitled to Sue in the Courts of this Country is a 'Person' within the Meaning of Sec-
tion 4 of the Clayton Act, and thus Entitled to Sue for Treble Damages Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 18 
VA.J. INT'L L. 370 (1978); Note, Standingfor Foreign Gov'ts - Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 
308 (1978), 19 HARV. INT'L L. J. 701 (1978); Casenote, Foreign Sovereigns as Private Antitrust Plain-
tiffs: Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov't of India, 20 B. C. L. REV. 411 (1979); 4 BRooKLYNJ. INT'L L. 287 (1978); 
Recent Developments, Antitrust Law - Clayton Act - Foreign Nations art 'Persons' within the Meaning of 
the Clayton Act, 8 GA. J. INT'L L. 950 (1978). 
This comment will present an analytical discussion of section 4 in terms of the legislative intent 
expressed at the time of its enactment. 
2. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). 
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resolving this issue in the affirmative, the Court accorded foreign govern-
ments standing3 to S\le in U. S. courts under the antitrust laws. 4 
In Pfizer, the governments of India, Iran, and the Philippines (hereinafter 
3. The Court's use of the word 'standing' is used as an equivalent of 'protected by the statute' 
and is not used to denominate the traditional notion of standing. At the present time, no Supreme 
Court case has enunciated a test for antitrust standing. However, the circuit courts are not in 
agreement as to this test and have applied four different 'impact' tests. 
The first test, the 'direct injury' test, was first espoused in Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 
704 (3d Cir. 1910). This test requires a showing of 'direct' and 'primary' injuries resulting from 
the defendant's antitrust violations and those plaintiffs whose injuries are remote, indirect or in-
consequential are denied standing. See Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727,731 (10th 
Cir. 1973). 
The 'target area' test allows standing only when it can be shown that the plaintiff is within the 
area of the economy which is threatened by a breakdown of competitive conditions. See In re 
Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub. 
nom., Morgan v. Automobile Mfgrs. Ass'n, Inc., 414 U.S. 1045 (1973). The Second Circuit 
seems to apply a much narrower version of this test by requiring that the plaintiffs themselves 
were the intended 'targets' of the anticompetitive act. The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, ex-
tends standing to those plaintiffs who the defendant's actions were reasonably foreseen to affect. 
Compare Fields Production, Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 432 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. 
denied, 401 U.S. 949 (1971) wilh Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Productions, 433 F.2d 1073 (9th 
Cir. 1970), cerl. denied, 402 U.S. 923 (1971). 
The third test, the 'zone of interest' test, was adopted by the Sixth Circuit in Malamud v. 
Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F .2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975). This test requires a showing that the plaintiffs 
interests are" arguably within the zone of interests to be protected by the statute or constitutional 
guarantee in question."ld. at 1151, quoling Association of Data Processing Service Organiza-
tions, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). Therefore, the Clayton Act grants standing to a 
person "injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust 
laws." 15 U.S.C. S 15 (1976). 
Another test, recently adopted by the Third Circuit, requires a case-by-case analysis for stand-
ing under Section 4. The factors considered, inter alia, are the plaintiffs relationship to the defen-
dant and the plaintiffs position in the area of the economy endangered by the anticompetitive 
conduct. Braveman v. Basset Furniture Industries, Inc., 552 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1977); see Cromar 
Company v. Nuclear Materials & Equipment Corp., 543 F.2d 501 (3d Cir. 1976); see generally 
Sherman, Anlitrust Standing: From Loeb 10 Malamud, 51 N. Y. U. L. REV. 374 (1976); Berger & 
Bernstein, An Analytical Frameworkfor Anlilrust Standing, 86 YALE L. J. 809 (1977). 
'Recently, the Ninth Circuit has adopted a tripartite analysis: first some effect on American 
foreign commerce must be shown; second, a greater restraint may have to be shown to 
demonstrate that a sufficiently large effect is present and therefore the presence of an antitrust in-
jury; and finally, a determination of whether the interests of, and contacts with, the United States 
outweigh these same considerations as applied to other nations for purposes of extraterritorial 
authority. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976). 
4. Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 320. Section 1 of the Clayton Act defines the term 'antitrust laws,' as 
used in section 4, as comprised of the Sherman Act, parts of the Wilson Tariff Act, the Act 
amending the Wilson Act and the Clayton Act itself. 15 U.S.C. S 12 (1976). 
The Pfizer decision provoked an immediate response in the 95th Congress. Bills to overturn or 
modify the decision were introduced in both the House and Senate. H.R. 11942, 95th Cong., 2d 
Sess. S 3 (1978), would have prohibited suits by foreign nations altogether. The Senate response, 
S. 1874, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. S 3 (1978), would have limited recovery to actual damages and fur-
ther required a certification by the Attorney General that 1) the United States is entitled to sue in 
its own name and on its own behalf on a civil claim in the courts of such foreign sovereign and 2) 
such foreign sovereign by its own laws prohibits restrictive trade practices. See generally H.R. REP. 
No. 95-1397, Part I, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) (hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT); Clayton 
Act Amendments of 19'78: Hearing on Section 3 of H.R. 11942 Before the Subcomm. of International 
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Respondents) brought separate antitrust treble damages actions in various 
Federal District Courts against six pharmaceutical companies5 (hereinafter 
Petitioners). The actions were consolidated for trial in the United States 
District Court for the District of Minnesota. 6 The various complaints alleged 
Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on International Relations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) 
(hereinafter cited as International Relations Hearings); S. REP. No. 94·934, 95th Cong., Part I, 2d 
Sess. (1978). Both bills died after being reported out of their respective Committees. 
Efforts in the Senate in the 96th Congress have again atiempted to reach a balance between abo 
solute entitlement and a total prohibition of suits by foreign sovereigns. S. 300, 95th Cong., 2d 
Sess. S 3 (1979), parallels various bills introduced into the Senate in the 95th Congress. See S. 
REP. No. 96·239, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). As reported out of the Judiciary Committee, this 
bill reads in relevant part: 
SEC. 3. Section 4 of the Clayton Act is amended by adding at the end of that section the 
following new language: Provided, however, that suits under this section brought by 
foreign sovereign governments, departments, or agencies thereof, shall be limited to ac-
tual damages; and provided further, that no foreign sovereign may maintain an action 
in any court of the United States under the authority of this section unless its laws 
would have forbidden the type or category of conduct on which the action is based if 
that conduct had occurred within its territory at the time it occurred in the United 
States, and unless its laws allow the Government of the United States to recover 
damages caused by such conduct through the judicial or administrative processes of the 
foreign sovereign. 
This type of approach seems to be the most realistic from a politically acceptable point of view. 
See International Relalions Hearings, supra, at 4; HOUSE REPORT, supra, at 312. 
5. The pharmaceutical firms involved were Pfizer, Incorporated, American Cyanamid Com-
pany, Bristol-Myers Company, Squibb Corporation, Olin Corporation, and Upjohn Corpora-
tion. 
6. Similar actions were also brought by Spain, South Korea, West Germany, Columbia, 
Kuwait, and the Republic of Vietnam. Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 309 n.1. The latter two have had deci· 
sions reported relevant to the issue of standing. 
The action fIled by Kuwait was attacked on the ground that Kuwait,as a foreign government, 
lacked standing under section 4 of the Clayton Act. In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. 
Supp. 315, 316 (S.D. N.Y. 1971). The District Court in New York denied the motion. Its deter-
mination was based on the theory that a suit by a foreign government would add to the effective 
enforcement of the antitrust laws. /d. at 316. However, Kuwait stipulated to dismissal prior to an 
appellate decision. 
The suit brought by the Republic of Vietnam was dismissed by the United States District 
Court in Minnesota. This was affirmed on appeal. Republic of Vietnam v. Pfizer, Inc., 556 F.2d 
892 (8th Cir. 1977). Dismissal was grounded upon the fact that the Republic of Vietnam had 
ceased to exist, in law or in fact, as a state or government and that the United States had, as yet, 
not recognized any representative as the official sovereign in what was knoY'n as South Vietnam. 
/d. at 893-94; see Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612,613 n.3 (8th Cir. 1975). 
In June 1975, the Department of Justice requested the advice of the Department of State reo 
garding the position of the executive branch towards the Government of South Vietnam. 
Specifically, the inquiry concerned 1) whether the United States recognized the Government of 
the Republic of South Vietnam; 2) If not, did the United States recognize any Government as the 
official representative of South Vietnam; and 3) Whether any special circumstances might occur 
so as to warrant suspension rather than dismissal of the action on the behalf of South Vietnam. E. 
McDoWELL, DIGEST OF U.S. PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 30-31 (1975). 
In response, the Department of State answered: 
We wish to advise you that the answer to all three questions is no. The Government of 
the Republic of Viet-Nam has ceased to exist, and therefore the U.S. no longer 
recognizes it as the sovereign authority in the territory of South Viet-Nam. The U.S. 
has not recognized any other government as constituting such authority. Whether, 
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that the Petitioners had conspired to restrain and monopolize interstate and 
foreign trade in the m~nufacture, distribution and sale of broad spectrum an-
tibiotics in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 7 Each Respondent 
claimed that it had been impaired in its business or property as a purchaser of 
antibiotics by the alleged antitrust violations and sought treble damages under 
section 4 of the Clayton Act on its own behalf and on behalf of several classes 
of foreign purchasers of antibiotics. 8 
when, and to what extent future events will alter this situation is now impossible to say. 
The Department of State would not advise any request to the court to suspend, rather 
than dismiss, the proceedings. 
Department of State, File No. P75 0142-511, reprinted in E. McDoWELL, DIGEST OF U.S. PRAC· 
TICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 31 (1975). 
The non-recognition of an official representative, i.e.~ an entirely new government, is a matter 
entirely different from a change in the governing regime or leadership. The right of a foreign na-
tion to sue in U.S. courts is vested in the nation as a sovereign and therefore a change in the 
regime or leadership, as opposed to what had occurred in South Vietnam, does not result in the 
loss of the right to sue. See The Sapphire, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 164 (1871), in which it was held that 
the reigning sovereign represents the national sovereignty and it is continuous and perpetual, 
residing in the proper successors. See also Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 
(1938). 
7. 15 U.S.C. U 1 & 2 (1976). They read in relevant part: 
§ 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is 
hereby declared to be illegal. 
§ 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or con-
spire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or com-
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a 
felony. 
8. India and Iran each alleged it was also a sovereign, foreign state with whom the United 
States maintains diplomatic relations; the Philippines alleged it was a sovereign and independent 
government. Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 310. These claims are important only insofar as it has long been 
established that only governments recognized by and at peace with the United States are entitled 
to access to its courts. See note 12 infra. 
India and Iran also sued in a parens patriae capacity. These claims were dismissed in a separate 
appeal and were not at issue in lJizer. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1975): 
Suits by a sovereign in the parens patriae capacity have traditionally been limited to 
certain narrow areas. Under English law, the king had the prerogative to act as a guard-
ian of persons under such legal disabilities as infancy, incompetency and insanity. In 
addition, the king superintended charitable uses. In the United States, these parens 
patriae prerogatives were expanded to include the right of a state to sue for the general 
welfare of its citizens at large, 'to prevent or repair harm to its 'quasi-sovereign' in-
terests. ' 
[d. at 616; see Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 405 U.S. 251, 257-58 (1972). 
The Court stated in Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d at 617-18, that the parens patriae claim was 
inapplicable to foreign sovereigns because, at the time of dismissal, domestic states had been 
denied such a weapon by the Supreme Court in Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 
(1972). The Court believed "[p)rinciples of comity, international law and existing United States 
treaties do not afford foreign sovereigns the right to press their citizens' claims in a manner 
barred to domestic states vis-a-vis their citizens." Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d at 618. 
Since then, however, Congress has enacted as part of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Im-
provements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. U 15c-15h (1976). This statute allows a State Attorney 
General to bring a civil action as parens patriae on behalf of the state's citizens. For the history of 
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The Petitioners asserted, as an affirmative defense to the complaints, that 
the Respondents as foreign nations were not 'persons' entitled to commence 
an action under the antitrust laws. 9 The District Court found no indication of 
a Congressional intent to foreclose a foreign nation, as a purchaser of com-
modities shipped in foreign commerce, from a civil remedy of treble damages 
which is available to other foreign purchasers who suffer harm as a result of a 
violation of the Act. IO The Court of Appeals affirmed, \1 relying upon the 
analysis of the District Court and the fact that "civil suits by foreign 
sovereigns have long been recognized.in the Federal Courts. "12 The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to resolve this issue. I! 
In a five to three decision the Court held that foreign governments are 'per-
sons' within the meaning of section 4- and that therefore they have standing to 
sue in U.S. courts.a Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart first indicated 
that although the question of whether a foreign government is a 'person' as 
the Act, Set H.R. REP. No. 94-499, 94th Cong., lst Sess. (1975), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 2572-96. 
The 1976 Act appears to question the validity of Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord today. Although the court 
ruled a remedy not afforded a domestic state is an equally inappropriate remedy for a foreign 
government, it was suggested that a foreign government should be entitled to a remedy that is 
available to a domestic state. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d at 619. The issue here, just as it is in 
the section 4 standing issue, is whether a Congressional intent to include foreign governments in 
the remedy can be fostered from the statute, legislative history, subject matter, context and ex-
ecutive interpretations. For a brief analysis of these factors, see Comment, Repmentative Antitrust 
Suits by Foreign Nations: A Cause without a Cause of Action, 8 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 562 (1978). Cf 
Comment, "Parens Patriae" Suits by Foreign Governments - Foreign Governments Possessing On(y a Pro-
prietary Interest in an Antitrust Treble Damage Action Cannot Sue "Parens Patriae" for Injury to Their 
Citizens, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 437 (1975). 
9. Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 311. 
10. Set id. at 311; Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 550 F.2d 396 (8th Cir. 1976). 
11. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government oflndia, 550 F .2d 396 (8th Cir. 1976). The Court of Appeals 
adhered to its decision upon rehearing en bane. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 550 F.2d 
400 (8th Cir. 1976). 
12. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government oflndia, 550 F.2d at 397. The general rule is that foreign na-
tions are entitled to bring suit in U.S. courts. See The Sapphire, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 164 (1871); 
Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sab-
batino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); First Nat. City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 
(1972). One exception arises when the foreign nation is at war with the United States. This prin-
ciple is codified in the Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. App. S 2(b) (1976), which defines 
'enemy' as including "the government of any nation with which the United States is at war, or 
any political or municipal subdivision thereof, or any officer, agent, or agency thereof." In Sab-
balino, the Court noted that a recognized foreign nation may resort to U. S. courts if it has any 
relationship with the United States short of war. 376 U.S. at 409. 
A second exception occurs when the foreign nation is not recognized by the United States. See 
note 5 supra. Guaran!y Trust held that the recognized representative of a foreign nation is to be 
determined by the executive branch. This determination is conclusive on all domestic courts. 304 
U.S. at 137-38. The Supreme Court has expressly rejected proposals that the severance of 
diplomatic relations, 'unfriendly' relations, or lack of reciprocity should deny a foreign nation the 
right to sue in U.S. courts. Sabhatino, 376 U.S. at 408-11. 
13. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government ofIndia, 430 U.S. 964 (1977). 
14. Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 311. 
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this term is used in section 4 is covered neither explicitly by any statutory pro-
vision nor implicitly by any legislative history, Congress intended the word to 
have a broad and inclusive meaning in accordance with the antitrust laws' ex-
pansive remedial purpose .15 The Court then found that the application of the 
treble damages remedy to foreign interests was not precluded by the antitrust 
laws. 16 This analysis was based upon the inclusion of foreign corporations in 
section 1 of the Clayton Act, which defines the word 'person'17 and upon the 
extension of this statute to trade with foreign countries. 18 Since a foreign na-
tion can be the victim of anti-competitive practices in the same manner as a 
private person or domestic state, the Court reasoned that Congress could not 
have intended to deny foreign nations the treble damages remedy available to 
others injured through violations of the antitrust laws. 19 
In Pfizer, the Court for the first time squarely confronted the unresolved 
issue of the scope of the treble damages remedy of section 4 of the Clayton Act 
as applied to foreign governments. In discussing the significance and impact 
of Pfizer, this Comment will analyze the Court's holding in light of the pur-
pose, subject matter, context and legislative history of the U.S. antitrust 
laws. 20 First, it will set out the manner in which foreign interests have normal-
ly been brought within the reach of U.S. laws and the manner in which the 
Supreme Court has applied the definition of 'person' in the Sherman and the 
Clayton Acts in two cases involving the United States and the State of Georgia 
as sovereign plaintiffs. Second, it will discuss the case with regard to the 
Court's analysis of the language of the statutes involved, the purpose behind 
the statutes, and the Court's reliance on precedent. Finally, this Comment 
will analyze the basis for the Court's holding in Pfizer in the light of the an-
titrust laws' ultimate aim of benefitting American interests. The author will 
conclude that the Court's reliance on distinguishing cases that involved a 
sovereign's right to treble damages is misplaced and that treble damage suits 
by foreign governments are not necessary to effectuate either the compen-
satory or deterrent elements of the antitrust laws. 
II. THE BASIS FOR HOLDING THAT FOREIGN SOVEREIGNS ARE 'PERSONS' 
The Pfizer Court needed to lay a foundation upon which to build a conclu-
sion with respect to foreign governments and section 4 of the Clayton Act. The 
next three subsections briefly describe existing doctrines of law in the United 
States from which the Pfizer Court based its decision. 
15. 1d. at 312. 
16. /d. at 313-15. 
17. See S III. A irifra for the text oU 1 of the Sherman Act. 
18. See note 7 supra. 
19. 1d. at 318. 
20. /d. at 313; see also United States v. Cooper, 312 U.S. 600, 605 (1941); Georgia v. Evans, 
316 U.S. 159, 161 (1942). 
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A. The Extraterritorial Application of the U.s. Antitrust Laws: Subject Matte, 
Jurisdiction 
United States courts have long acknowledged Congressional authority to 
regulate foreign relations of the United States. 21 When Congress identifies 
specific conduct outside the United States to which a statute applies,22 a court 
is "bound to follow the Congressional direction unless this would violate the 
due process requirement of the Fifth Amendment. "23 However, most legisla-
tion is drafted to deal with some problem existing in the United States, and lit-
tle or no consideration is given to applying the statute extraterritorially. 24 
Therefore, courts are constantly required to decide the scope of the statute in-
volved and thereby determine if the court has subject matter jursidiction. 
Subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold question in any antitrust dispute. 25 
This issue was first addressed by the Supreme Court in American Banana Co. v. 
United Fruit CO.26 Mr. Justice Holmes wrote that "the general and almost 
universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be 
determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done. "27 Since 
the conduct that was alleged to have caused injury to American Banana was 
committed by the Costa Rican government, and thereby lawful by definition 
within its own jurisdiction, it would be impossible to prove that United Fruit 
2l. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
22. Me, e.g., Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 1-6, 7-39, 41-44 (1976). 
23. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972); s.e 
United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945). 
24. See, e.g., Bersch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir.), ctTl. denied, 
423 U.S. 1018 (1975). 
25. This issue should not be confused with the determination of a substantive offense under 
the antitrust laws. Se. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F.Supp. 92,102 
(C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), mi. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972); Rasmussen v. 
American Dairy Association, 472 F.2d 517, 521-524 (9th Cir. 1972), mi. denied, 412 U.S. 950 
(1973). 
26. 213 U.S. 347 (1909). United Fruit, before the formation of American Banana, engaged in 
conduct with the intent to control and monopolize the banana trade. /d. at 354. Such conduct in-
cluded purchasing the property and business of many of its competitors and making agreements 
with other competitors to regulate the quantity to be purchased and the price to be paid. [d. In 
1904, American Banana bought a banana plantation in Panama along with the right to build a 
railway. One month later, at the 'instigation' of United Fruit, the Costa Rican government 
seized American Banana's plantation and supplies and stopped the construction and operation of 
the railway. /d. at 354-55. The land, through two separate transactions, ended up in the posses-
sion of United Fruit. /d. 
As a result of the defendant's act the plaintiff has been deprived of the use of the planta-
tion, and the railway, the plantation and supplies have been injured. The defendant 
also, by outbidding, has compelled producers to come to its terms, and it has prevented 
the plaintiff from buying for export and sale. This is the substantial damage alleged. 
/d. at 355. 
27. /d. at 356. "The acts causing the damage were done, so far as appears, outside the 
jurisdiction of the United States and within that of other states. It is surprising to hear it argued 
that they were governed by the act of Congress." /d. at 355. 
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violated the antitrust laws. 28 At no point in the opinion did the Court discuss 
the effect upon U.S. commerce.2i• 
However, the primary factor in any determination of subject matter 
jurisdiction under the antitrust laws subsequent to American Banana has been 
whether the conduct adversely affects the commerce of the United States. 30 In 
United States v. American Tobacco CO.31 the Court invalidated an agreement, ex-
ecuted in England, between a number of American companies and two 
English corporations to limit their business to their respective countries. 32 The 
28. Id. at 358. 
29. See Kintner and Hallgarten, Application of United States Antitrust Laws to Foreign Trade and 
Commerce - Variations on American Banana Since 1909, 15 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REV. 343, 347-48 
(1973). For discussions of United States antitrust laws and foreign commerce, see E. KINTNER. 
THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (1977); K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND 
AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD (1958) [hereinafter cited as BREWSTER); W. FUGATE, FOREIGN 
COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS (2d ed. 1973); E. KINTNER & M. JOELSON, AN INTERNA-
TIONAL ANTITRUST PRIMER (1974); Rahl, American Antitrust and Foreign Operations: What is 
Covered,8 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 1 (1974); Baker, Antitrust and World Trade: Tempest in an International 
Teapot?, 8 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 16 (1974); Davidow, Antitrust, Foreign Policy, and International Buy-
ing Cooperation, 84 YALE L. J. 268 (1974);Joelson & Griffin, MultinationalJoint Ventures and the U.S. 
Antitrust Laws, 15 VA.J, INT'L L. 487 (1975). 
30. A number of different criteria have been espoused to describe the type of effect necessary 
to support jurisdiction in cases involving restraints outside the United States: see, e.g., Thomson 
v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66, 88 (1917) ('affects'); United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 
148 F.2d at 445 (,affects'); United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F.Supp. 513, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 
1945), aff'd and modified, 332 U.S. 319 (1947) ('affects'); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes 
Gas & Oil Co., 331 F.Supp. 92, 102-03 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950' (1972) (,directly affects'); Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex 
Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743 (1976) ('substantially affects'); Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton 
Co., 234 F.2d 633,641 (2d Cir.), ctrl. denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956) ('substantially affects'); United 
States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F.Supp. 284,309 (N.D. Ohio 1949), aff'd and modified, 
341 U.S. 593 (1951) ('direct and influencing'); Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon 
Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 705 (1962) (has an 'impact upon'); U.S. Dept. of Justice, Antitrust Divi-
sion, Antitrust Guide for International Operations (Jan. 26, 1977), reprinted in 16B J. VON 
KALINOWSKI, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS (1979) ('substantial and foreseeable') (hereinafter cited 
as Antitrust Guide). 
This last formula, i.e., 'substantial and foreseeable', is very similar to the RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES S 18 (1965): 
/d. 
A State has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to 
conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory, if 
either 
a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent elements of 
crime or tort under the law of States that have reasonable developed legal syslems, 
or 
b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to which the rule 
applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as a direct 
and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory; and (iv) the rule is not 
inconsistent with the principles of justice generally recognized by States that have 
reasonably developed legal systems. 
31. 221 U.S. 106 (1911). 
32. /d. at 172. Division of markets are now per se violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act. See 
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (division of markets are 
unreasonable restraints under the Sherman Act); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 
341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). 
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substantial impact of the agreement on competition in U.S. commerce pur-
suaded the Court to find the division of markets illegal under sections 1 and 2 
of the Sherman Act. 33 
These early decisions demonstrate that the antitrust laws "may apply, not 
only to conduct in this country, but also to acts abroad, performed by an 
American firm acting alone or in concert with foreign firms with such substan-
tial effects upon American foreign commerce as amount to unreasonable 
restraints, attempts to monopolize, or monopolization. "34 The classic state-
ment defining the extent to which the antitrust laws may be applied to actions 
committed abroad was expressed in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 
(hereinafter Alcoa):35 "It is settled law ... that any state may impose liabilities, 
even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders 
that has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends. "36 
In Alcoa, it was alleged that Alcoa, an American corporation, and 
Aluminum Limited, a Canadian company owned by Alcoa, had conspired 
with French, Swiss and British ingot producers to restrain the interstate and 
foreign commerce of the United States in violation of the Sherman ActY 
Despite the fact that the parties were neither U. S. citizens nor corporations 
and that the alleged illegal conduct occurred in its entirety outside the United 
States, the Court held that the antitrust laws were violated since the 
agreements were not only intended to substantially affect American imports, 
but such activities were coupled with actual injurious affects. 38 
Nevertheless, a discussion of the vagaries of comity was espoused by the 
33. American Tobacco, 221 U.S. at 184. Similarly, the Supreme Court in United States v. Sisal 
Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927), emphasized the "forbidden results within the United States," 
at 276. The trial court had dismissed the complaint finding American Banana controlling. The 
Supreme Court reversed finding "the circumstances of the present controversy ... radically dif-
ferent from those presented in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co . ... " The Court went on to 
explain that: 
Here we have a contract, combination and conspiracy entered into by parties within the 
United States and made effective by acts done therein. The fundamental object was 
control of both importation and sale of sisal and complete monopoly of both internal 
and external trade and commerce therein. The United States complain of a variation of 
their laws within their own territory by parties subject to their jurisdiction, not merely 
of something done by another government at the instigation of private parties. 
Id.; see Sanib Corporation v. United Fruit Company, 135 F.Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); United 
States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. , 70,600 
(S.D.N.Y. 1962). 
34. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST 
LAWS 70 (1955) (footnotes omitted). 
35. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
36. Id. at 443. 
37. /d. at 442. Alcoa was found not to be a part of this 'Alliance,' and it "did not join in any 
violation of § 1 of the [Sherman] Act, so far as concerned with foreign commerce." /d. 
38. [d. at 443-44. "Both agreements would dearly have been unlawful, had they been made 
within the United States; and it follows from what we have just said that both were unlawful, 
though made abroad, if they were intended to affect imports and did affect them." [d. at 444. 
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Pfizer Court at the expense of a more realistic analysis of any injurious effect 
upon U.S. commerce and section 4- of the Clayton Act. 59 
Generally, the laws of the United States have no effect beyond the bound-
aries of the sovereign from which their power is derived. +0 The extent to which 
these laws may be permitted to operate within the dominion of another nation 
is subject to the principle of comity. Comity in the legal sense "is neither a 
matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and 
goodwill, upon the other."+1 It is the approbation which one nation accords to 
the conduct of another nation with respect to its laws, emphasizing both an in-
ternational duty and convenience, and the rights of individuals who, as a mat-
ter of course, are under the protection of its laws. +2 It has long been the policy 
of the United States that foreign sovereigns or foreign persons who have 
claims of a civil nature against any person in the United States may institute 
suit in U.S. courts.+5 "To deny him this privilege would manifest a want of 
comity and unfriendly feelings."++ However, whether a foreign government 
has standing to sue under a specific statute depends upon the interpretation of 
the statute itself. +, 
In Pfizer the Supreme Court did not recognize any legislative history with 
respect to, nor any specific language in, the U.S. antitrust laws which provid-
ed any guidance for determining whether foreign governments are 'persons' 
within section 4- of the Clayton Act. +6 The Court relied principally on case law 
to determine the effect that the 'sovereign' attribute has on allowing a treble 
damage suit by foreign governments. The Supreme Court had considered the 
inclusion of a sovereign within the ambit of the antitrust laws on two prior oc-
casions and had reached two different results. 
39. For the relation between jurisdiction and international law, see I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES 
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 291-314 (2d ed. 1976); 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 118-83 (1968). 
40. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895). 
41. Id. at 163-64; see Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 409; Guaranty Trust, 304 U.S. 126 (1938). 
42. When an action is brought in a court of[the United States) by a citizen ofa foreign 
country against [a citizen of the United States), to recover a sum of money ad-
judged by a court of that-country to be due from the defendant to the plaintiff, a 
judgment is prima facie evidence, at least of the matter adjudged; and the judg-
ment is conclusive upon the merits tried in the foreign court. 
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. at 205. This is prima facie evidence only, and not conclusive of the 
merits of the claim if by the law of the foreign country judgments of the courts of the United 
States are not recognized as conclusive. ]d. at 227-28. 
43. See The Sapphire, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) i64 (1870); Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 409; Guaranty 
Trust, 304 U.S. 126 (1934). 
44. The Sapphire, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 167. 
45. Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 311. 
46. ]d. at 312. 
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B. United States v. Cooper 
In United States v. Cooper (hereinafter Cooper)47 the word 'person' in the Sher-
man and Clayton Acts was said not to create a "hard and fast rule of exclu-
sion" of governmental bodies. 48 Cooper held that the United States was not a 
'person' entitled to bring suit for treble damages. 49 The reasoning was simple 
and straightforward. The Sherman Act provides separate and distinct 
remedies for the United States on the one hand, and suits for treble damages 
granted to redress private injury on the other. 50 Although the United States is 
a juristic person and is therefore ordinarily entitled to all legal remedies 
available to any other party,51 the Court pointed out that the Sherman Act 
created new rights and remedies which would be accorded only to those upon 
whom they had been specifically conferred by the Act. 52 The issue before the 
Court was whether Congress intended the United States to come within the 
ambit of the phrase 'any person.'53 Writing for the Court, Justice Roberts 
opined that the common usage of the phrase' any person' denied inclusion of a 
sovereign "[b]ut there is no hard and fast rule of exclusion. "54 He relied 
heavily on the scheme and structure of the Sherman Act as well as upon its 
legislative history. 55 
The opinion in Cooper noted that sections 1 through 6 of the Sherman Act, 
as they appeared in 1941, dealt with criminal and civil remedies of the United 
States. The only other substantive section was section 7, which provided a civil 
action for an injury to property rights. 56 The Court felt compelled to rely on 
47. 312 U.S. 600 (1941). The United States had brought a civil action under the predecessor 
of section 4 of the Clayton Act (Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, § 7,26 Stat. 210) against the Cooper 
Corporation and 17 other defendants to recover treble damages. United States v. Cooper, 31 
F.Supp. 848 (S.D. N.Y.), aJl'd, 114 F.2d 413 (2d Cir. 1940). The complaint alleged that the in-
juries resulted from an agreement to fIX prices in violation of the antitrust laws. United States v. 
Cooper, 114 F.2d at 413. 
48. Cooper, 312 U.S. at 604-05. 
49. In 1955 Congress granted the United States the authority to bring an action for actual 
damages. See 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1976). 
50. The original Sherman Act, Act of July 2,1890, ch. 647, §§ 1-4,6 & 7, 26 Stat. 209-210, 
provided the United States with criminal prosecutions under §§ 1, 2 & 3, injunction under § 4, 
and seizure of property under § 6; § 7 provided a private remedy of treble damages. In response 
to Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 194 U.S. 48 (1904), Congress enacted an amendment 
to permit a private litigant an injunctive remedy in 1914. See 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976). 
51. Cooper, 312 U.S. at 604. 
52. /d. 
53. [d. at 603-04. 
54. /d. at 604-05. "The purpose, the subject matter, the context, the legislative history, and 
the executive interpretation of the statute are aids to construction which may indicate an intent, 
by the use of the term, to bring a state or nation within the scope of the law." /d. at 605. 
55. [d. at 605-08. 
56. /d. at 608. "It seems evident that the [Sherman] Act envisaged two classes of action -
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this specific intent of exclusion in order to hold that the United States should 
not be awarded the same treble damages remedy that was available to a 
private litigant. 57 
The legislative history of the Sherman Act persuaded the Court that the Act 
was not intended to provide the United States a civil action for treble 
damages. The original proposed bill was introduced by Senator Sherman on 
December 4, 1889 and was immediately referred to the Committee on 
Finance.58 The bill, as reported out of the Committee on Finance, was made 
up oftwo sections: section 1 provided for various civil actions to be brought by 
the United States and section 2 provided a double damages remedy for private 
citizens of the United States. 59 When Senator Hoar rewrote the bill,60 he re-
tained section 2 of the bill - increasing the recoverable damages to treble and 
renumbering the section as 'section 7. '61 
The Court held the text of the Sherman Act, 
taken in its natural and ordinary sense, makes against the extension 
of the term 'person' to include the United States, and that the usual 
aids to construction, taken together, instead of inducing the con-
trary conclusion, go to support the view that Congress did not use 
the word [with the intention of including the United States].62 
those made available only to the Government, which are first provided in detail, and, in addition, 
a right of action for treble damages granted to redress private injury." Id. 
57. Id. 
58. The bill, S.l, 51st Cong., lst Sess. (1889), was read twice and then referred to the Com-
mittee on Finance. &e 21 CONGo REC. 96 (1889). 
59. Sections 1-7 of the Sherman Act, as enacted originally, were revised editions of Senator 
Sherman's proposed bill. The proposed bill had read in relevant part: 
Section 1 
[AJnd the circuit court of the United States shall have original jurisdiction of all .uits of 
a civil nature at common law or in equity arising under this section, and to issue all 
remedial process, orders, or writs proper and necessary to enforce its provision. And the 
Attorney General and the several District Attorneys are hereby directed, in the name of 
the United States, to commence and prosecute all such cases to final judgment and ex-
ecution. 
Section 2 
That any person or corporation injured or damnified by such arrangement, contract, 
agreement, trust or combination defined in the first section of this Act may sue for and 
recover, in any court of the United States of competent jurisdiction, without respect to 
the amount involved, of any person or corporation a party to a combination described 
in the first section of the Act, twice the amount of damages sustained and the costs of the 
suit, together with a reasonable attorney's fee. 
S.l, 51st Cong., lst Seas. (1889) (as reported out of the Committee on Finance), reprinted in 1 
TOULMIN, A TREATISE ON THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 5 (1949). 
Senator Sherman asserted that the right to sue for double damages under the proposed S 2 (the 
enacted S 7) provided a purely personal remedy. 21 CONGo REC. 2564 (1890). 
60. See Let~in, Congress and the ShemuJn Laws, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 221 (1955). 
61. See Cooper, 312 U.S. at 612. 
62. Id. at 614. 
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In other words, the Sherman Act, itself, in conjunction with the Congressional 
debates on the Sherman and Clayton Acts afforded the Court clear evidence 
that Congress affirmatively intended to exclude the United States from the tre-
ble damages remedy. 63 
C. Georgia v. Evans 
The second case, Georgia v. Evans (hereinafter Evans)64 was decided the very 
next term.65 It conferred the treble damages remedy, denied to the United 
States in Cooper, upon all domestic states. 66 In Evans, as in Cooper, a mechanical 
definition of 'person' was not applied and the entire statutory context was con-
sidered,61 
However, the Court had to distinguish Cooper in order to reach its conclu-
sion. The Court determined that Cooper was limited to a very narrow issue: 
whether Congress intended the United States to be included within the phrase 
'any person' therefore having the right to maintain a treble damages action on 
its own behalf. "It was not held that the word 'person,' abstractly considered, 
could not include a governmental body. "68 The inclusion or exclusion of each 
entity depends upon its legislative environment. 69 The considerations which 
led to the conclusion in Cooper were not present in Evans. As opposed to deny-
ing a remedy to the United States, to deprive the State of Georgia (and all 
other domestic states) the treble damages remedy' 'would deny all redress to a 
State, when mulcted by a violator of the Sherman Law, merely because it is a 
State.' '70 Although this question was not considered during the debates on the 
antitrust laws, the Court refused to accept the proposition that Congress in-
63. While the Clayton Act was before the Senate, the usual type of prosecutions under the 
Sherman Act were enumerated by Senator Culberson, the Chairman of the committee that 
reported the bill. Those indicated were criminal prosecutions, suits in equity, and actions for 
damages and that with respect to government suits under the Sherman and Clayton Acts" there 
[was] no suit authorized by any ofthese statutes by the United States except criminal prosecution 
or a suit in equity. The United States does not bring a suit at law for damages." 51 CONGo REC. 
13898 (1914) (remarks of Sen. Culberson). 
64-. 316 U.S. 159 (1942). The State of Georgia had brought an action against certain corpora-
tions and individuals to recover treble damages as a result of injuries allegedly caused by a con-
spiracy to control the sale of emulsified asphalt throughout the United States in violation of the 
antitrust laws, Georgia v. Evans, 123 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1941). 
65. The defendants were American Bitumuls Co., Shell Oil Co., Inc., Emulsified Asphalt 
Refining Co., Hiram Wesley Evans, a dealer in emulsified asphalt and John W. Greer, Jr., pur-
chasing agent for the State Highway Board of Georgia. 
66. Id. at 162-63. See Chattanooga Foundry v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906) (allowing a 
municipality the treble damages remedy). 
67. Evans, 316 U.S. at 161. 
68. /d. 
69. /d. 
70. /d. at 162-63. 
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tended to deprive a state of the remedy made available to all other victims of 
antitrust violations. 71 
Preliminarily, these two Supreme Court cases suggest that standing of a 
foreign sovereign is not necessarily precluded by the antitrust laws. With this 
in mind, the Pfizer Court opted for the reasoning in Evans and permitted 
foreign sovereigns the right to seek a private treble damages remedy. 72 
III. PFIZER, INC. V. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA 
A. The Court's Statutory Anarysis 
The starting point for the Court's determination in Pfizer was an analysis of 
sections 1 and 4 of the Clayton Act which define the word 'person' and confer 
the treble damages remedy on those entities falling within the precisely 
enumerated categories, respectively.73 Section 1 provides in relevant part: 
The word 'person' or 'persons' whenever used in this act shall be 
deemed to include74 corporations and associations existing under or 
authorized by the laws75 of either the United States, the laws of any 
71. "Nothing in the Act, its history, or its policy, could justify so restrictive a construction of 
the word 'person' in [the predecessor to S 4- of the Clayton Act] as to exclude a state." /d. at 162. 
72. The Supreme Court in 11izeT maintained that since, as independent considerations, being 
foreign and being a sovereign nation did not necessarily exclude a foreign government from the 
protection of the antitrust laws, the only logical conclusion to be drawn was that the antitrust laws 
were intended to encompass foreign governments. 434- U.S. at 313-18. However, these attributes 
considered jointly preclude inclusion of a foreign sovereign within the phrase' any person' . See S 
I1I.B i'!fra. 
73. See Pfizer, 4-34- U.S. at 311-12. 
74-. Although 'includes' is sometimes taken as interchangeable with 'means,' these two terms 
are not necessarily synonomous. "The natural distinction would be that where 'means' is 
employed, the term and its definition are to be interchangeable equivalents, and that the verb' in-
cludes' imports a general class, some of whose particular instances are those specified in the 
definition." Helvering v. Morgan's, Inc., 293 U.S. 121, 125 n.l (1934-). Notwithstanding the 
reliance placed by the Court in H,lvering on what is now I.R.C. S 7701(b) defining 'include' and 
'includes' as not excluding other things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined, no 
issue shall be made of this basic assumption as applied to 'includes' in section 1 of the Clayton 
Act: Evans lends ample support for such a proposition. 
75. Cooper and Evans both lead to the determination that a foreign government shall not be 
construed as a corporation existing under, or authorized by, the laws of any foreign country. 
In Cooper, the Court said in passing that "the argument that the United States may be treated 
as a corporation organized under its own laws . . . seems so strained as not to merit serious con-
sideration." 312 U.S. at 607. And in Evans, the Court declared that 
when in . . . [the predecessor to section 1 of the Clayton Act] Congress took the trou-
ble to include as 'persons' corporations organized under the laws of a State, the in-
~rence is plain that the State itself was not to be deemed a corporation organized under 
its own laws, any more than the United States is to be deemed a corporation organized 
under its own laws. 
316 U.S. at 163-64-. (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
It is inconceivable that Congress could have contemplated the use of the antitrust laws by a 
foreign government in a manner totally incongruous with that of a domestic sovereign. Cj Pfizer, 
Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d at 619. The Federal Republic of Germany, as amicus curiae, argued that 
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of the territories, the laws of any state, or the laws of any foreign 
country.76 (footnotes added) 
Section 4 provides: 
That atry person who shall be injured in his business or property by 
reason of atrything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore in 
any district court of the United States in the district in which the 
defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the 
amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by 
him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee. 77 (emphasis supplied). 
157 
The Court, without searching beyond the actual language of section 4, found 
the phrase 'any person' alone to be insufficient to authorize an action by a 
foreign government. 78 However, the Court found the broad scope of the 
remedies of the antitrust laws noted in Cooper and Evans and the legislative 
histories to be persuasive. 79 
B. The 'Purpose' Basis for the Supreme Court's Decision in Pfizer 
The Court noted that the treble damages provision of the antitrust laws 
served two purposes, neither of which was inconsistent with a suit by a foreign 
sovereign.80 It was designed to deter violators and to compensate victims for 
injuries resulting from antitrust violations.81 The broad scope of section 4, the 
inclusive language used in various cases82 and the legislative history83 were 
The Federal Republic of Germany is a corporation under the laws of the Federal 
Republic of Germany. This point is not subject to doubt or dispute .... As a corpora-
tion, the Federal Republic is capable of possessing rights, and under the German Civil 
Procedure Code, has both capacity to sue and corresponding susceptibility to be 
sued .... 
Thus, the Federal Republic of Germany does not contend that it may be regarded or 
should be treated as a corporation, but more simply, that it is a corporation under its 
own law. 
Brief of Federal Republic of Germany at 2-3, as Amicus Curiae, Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of In-
dia, 434 U.S. 308 (1978) (footnotes omitted). 
76. 15 U.S.C. S 7 (1976). 
77. 15 U.S.C. S 15 (1976). 
78. Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 312. 
79. /d. at 312-13. 
80. Set id. at 314-15. 
81. /d. at 314; Sit Illinois Brick Co. v. lllinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977); Brunswick Corp. v. 
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977); Perma Life Mumers, Inc. v. International Parts 
Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968). 
82. The Court, in quoting from a previous case, found "[tJhe Act ... comprehensive in its 
terms and coverage, protecting all who are made victims ofthe forbidden practices by whomever 
they may be perpetrated." Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 312, quoting Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. 
American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1947). 
83. Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 312-13; Sit also 21 CONGo REC. 2569, 3148 (1890) (remarks of Senators 
Sherman & George, respectively). 
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noted by the Court in further support of its conclusion that the term 'person' 
included a foreign government. 
As in Cooper and Evans, "[t]he purpose, the subject matter, the context, the 
legislative history ... of the statute [were] aids to construction" which in-
dicated the scope of section 4 to the Pfizer Court. 8f However, any argument of 
exclusion of a foreign government from the broad scope of section 4 must rest 
either on the attribute of being foreign or being a sovereign nation. 85 
As to the first attribute, being foreign, the Court emphasized that not-
withstanding contemporaneous tariff bills,86 any inference that the antitrust 
laws were intended to protect only American consumers could not be drawn. 87 
Support for this conclusion was found under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman 
Act, which enable foreign corporations to sue for treble damages and specify 
that the antitrust laws extend to trade with foreign countries as well as to trade 
among the several states. 88 
Additionally, the Court presumed that treble damage suits by foreign na-
tionshave beneficial effects for the American consumer. 89 Even if the primary 
goal of the antitrust laws is to protect American consumers, this does not, ipso 
facto, preclude the provision of a remedy to foreign nations. 90 The Court 
noted that the ultimate purpose of the antitrust laws is inapposite to the identi-
ty of the parties who are permitted to invoke statutory remedies. 91 
It is clear that the Court was stressing the deterrent effect a treble damage 
suit is intended to promqte. It was held that an exclusion of foreign nations 
would not only defeat this purpose, but would enable foreign nations to enter 
into anti-competitive alliances that would ultimately be injurious to the 
American consumer.92 If an antitrust violator must account for the total costs 
of its conduct, American consumers will benefit since corporations would not 
be permitted to offset domestic liability with exhorbitant prices abroad. 93 For 
these reasons, the Court was prompted to conclude that foreclosure from the 
courts of the United States is not compelled by simply being foreign. 
The second characteristic, being sovereign, necessitated the consideration 
of Cooper and Evans. 9f Both of these cases dealt with the status of a sovereign 
government as a 'person' under the antitrust laws and neither applied a 
84. /.1izer, 434 U.S. at 313. 
85. Id. 
86. The Webb-Pomerene Act, 15U.S.C. n 61-66 (1976). 
87. /.1izer, 434 U.S. at 313-14. 
88. Id.; Set n 1 & 2 of the Sherman Act, note 6 supra. 
89. "Treble damage suits by foreigners who have been victimized by antitrust violations clear-
ly may contribute to the protection of American consumers." Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 314. 
90. Id. at 314. 
91. Id. 
92. ]d. at 315. 
93. ]d. 
94. Set id. at 316. 
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mechanical rule in reaching its determination. 95 Cooper denied the treble 
damages remedy to the United States by analyzing the language of the statute 
"in the light, not only of the policy intended to be served by the enactment, 
but, as well, by all other available aids to construction. "96 The Cooper Court 
noted the separate and distinct remedies provided in the Sherman Act for the 
United States on one hand and private litigants on the other." 
In Evans, domestic states were granted the treble damages remedy. "As in 
Cooper, the Court did not rest its decision upon a bare analysis of the word 
'person,' but relied instead upon the entire statutory context to hold that 
Georgia was entitled to sue.' '98 The Pfizer Court then noted that, unlike a 
situation involving the United States, deprivation of the treble damages 
remedy would deny any redress to a state when injured by an antitrust viola-
tion. The Evans' Court found no reason to believe that it was the desire of 
Congress to deprive a state of the remedy available to all others who are in-
jured as a result of an antitrust violation.99 The Pfizer Court held the reasoning 
of Evans to be applicable to a case involving a foreign sovereign, since the an-
titrust laws provide no alternative remedies for a foreign nation. 
We can perceive no reason for believing that Congress wanted to 
deprive a [foreign nation], as purchasers of commodities shipped in 
[international] commerce, of the civil remedy of treble damages 
which is available to other purchasers who suffer through the viola-
tion of the Act .... Nothing in the Act, its history, or its policy, 
could justify so restrictive a construction of the word 'person' in S 
7 .... Such a construction would deny all redress to a [foreign na-
tion], when mulcted by a violator of the Sherman Law merely 
because it is a [foreign nation]. 316 U.S. at 162-163. 100 
C. The Supreme Court's Reliance on PrecedmtlOI 
Faced with legislative history that did not even contemplate foreign 
nations,102 the Supreme Court analyzed the two prior relevant cases, Cooper 
and Evans, in seeking to elicit a legislative intent applicable to foreign 
sovereigns. These two cases dealt with the applicability of the treble damages 
remedy to sovereigns. Cooper denied the United States this remedy because the 
antitrust laws provided it with other alternatives, whereas the Court in Evans 
95. ]d. at 316-17; see also note 6+ and accompanying text supra. 
96. PJizer, 43+ U.S. at 316-317, quoting Cooper, 312 U.S. at 605. 
97. ]d. (discussing Cooper). 
98. ]d. at 317. 
99. ]d. 
100. ]d. at 318, quoting Evans, 316 U.S. at 162-63. 
101. See SS II.B, C, supra. 
102. "There is no statutory provision or legislative history that provides a clear answer; it 
seems apparent that the question was never considered at the time the Sherman and Clayton Acts 
were enacted."PJizer, 43+ U.S. at 312. 
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permitted domestic states to pursue this remedy since unlike the United 
States, the states had been given no other remedies to enforce the prohibitions 
of the law. I03 Neither case relied upon an analysis of the word 'person' in the 
statute, but relied instead upon the overall statutory context of the 
legislation. 104 
After analyzing the holdings in Cooper and Evans, the Pfizer Court went on to 
state that it was clear that Evans rejected the proposition that all sovereigns are 
excluded from the word 'person' as used in the antitrust laws. lOS The Court 
reasoned that the natural consequence of the reasoning used in Evans 
necessarily leads to the conclusion that a foreign government, like a domestic 
state, comes within the ambit of the phrase 'any person' in section 4 of the 
Clayton Act since it, too, is provided with no alternative remedies under the 
antitrust laws. 106 The Court concluded that a foreign sovereign is therefore en-
titled to sue for treble damages when injured by a violation of the antitrust 
laws. l07 
IV . ANALYSIS OF PFIZER 
The Pfizer Court incorrectly equates standing for foreign sovereigns under 
the antitrust laws with the absence of any explicit exclusionary language plus 
the expansive remedial purpose given to these laws. The Court was unwilling 
to reach two conclusions: 1) the Congressional attitude embodied in the an-
titrust laws states, sometimes explicitly, that U.S. consumers were to benefit 
from foreign commerce, even if to the detriment of foreigners and 2) the ap-
plicability of the Evans' reasoning is based upon a false proposition, i.e., it is 
not the case that foreign nations and domestic states are so essentially alike as 
to warrant similar treatment under the U.S. antitrust laws. 
A. The Court's Statutory Ana(ysis 
The determination in Pfizer was based on the interpretation ofthe statute. lOS 
However, the Court failed to find unambiguous any statutory provision or 
legislative history on the question of whether the phrase' any person' in sec-
tion 4 includes foreign nations. 109 In fact" it seem[ ed] apparent [to the Court] 
that the question was never considered at the time the Sherman and Clayton 
Acts were enacted." 110 
103. See Evans, 316 U.S. at 162. 
104. Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 313; Cooper, 312 U.S. at 605; Evans, 316 U.S. at 161. 
105. Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 318. 
106. /d. 
107. /d. 
108. /d. at 311. 
109. /d. at 312. Five of the eight judges in the Circuit Court of Appeals also concluded that the 
issue had not been discussed by Congress during the debates on the Clayton Act. The majority 
found "Congress, in passing S 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. S 15 (1976), gave no considera-
tion nor did it have any legislative intent whatsoever, concerning the question of whether foreign 
governments are 'persons' under the Act." Pfizer, Inc. v. Government ofIndia, 550 F.2d at 399. 
110. Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 312. 
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It seems that if this were the purpose of the antitrust laws, acknowledged 
formalities of speech would have led to an explicit reference. 111 "In common 
usage, the term 'person' does not include a [foreign] sovereign and statutes 
employing this phrase are ordinarily construed as excluding it. "112 However, 
as the Pfizer Court noted, a strict rule of exclusion had never existed within the 
ambit of statutory interpretation. 113 On the contrary, statutory language 
should be read in its "ordinary and natural sense" and if ambiguity lingers, it 
is to be resolved through reference to not only the intended policy of the 
legislation, but through the utilization of all odler available aids to construc-
tion, including legislative purpose, subject matter, context, legislative history 
and policy considerations. 11. 
B. The Purpose of the Antitrust Laws Does Not Dictate the Result in Pfizer 
The phrase 'any person' can be given meaning by inquiring into the nature 
of the antitrust laws to determine the intended beneficiaries and the proscribed 
transactions under these laws. Transactions not affecting U. S. commerce, 
either foreign or domestic, or its citizens do not create liability under the an-
titrust laws. 115 It is submitted that if transactions in foreign commerce with no 
adverse impact upon domestic trade are not subject to the antitrust laws unless 
specifically included, it necessarily follows that Congress could not have in-
tended to extend the antitrust laws to foreign governments. This interpreta-
tion is especially reasonable in light of the remedies presently available that 
benefit domestic consumers.1I6 
1. The U.S. Antitrust Laws Were Designed for the Protection of U.S. 
Citizens 
Although the legislative history of the Sherman and Clayton Acts is not very 
informative on this point, it does provide an indication of the legislative at-
111. See Davis v. Pringle, 268 U.S. 315 (1925). 
112. Cooper, 312 U.S. at 604. See also United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315 (1876). 
113. Pjiztr, 434 U.S. at 313. Cf Cooper, 312 U.S. 600; Evans, 316 U.S. 159. 
114. See Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 313; Cooper, 312 U.S. at 605; Evans, 316 U.S. at 161. 
115. "An American's conduct in trade among or trade within foreign nations is not of an· 
titrust concern, unless it is found to have prohibited consequences for competition in U. S. export, 
import or domestic markets." BREWSTER, supra note 27, at 76. 
"[T]o apply the Sherman Act to a combination of United States firms for foreign activities 
which have no direct or intended effect on United States consumers or export opportunities 
would, we believe, extend the Act beyond the point Congress must have intended." Antitrust 
Guide, supra note 30, at 154. 
116. [The U.S. has) a most effective arsenal in criminal and civil proceedings by the 
Department of Justice [with fines and prison sentences recently greatly increased), in 
proceedings by the Federal Trade Commission, and in private and parens patriae pro-
ceedings for treble damages and injunctions. It is hard to see how a newly created action 
on behalf of foreign governments adds in any measurable amount to effective enforce-
men!. 
S. REP. No. 94-934, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 107-08 (1978). 
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titude embodied in the antitrust laws. Treble damages for violations of the an-
titrust laws were first authorized by section 7 of the Sherman Act.l17 Discus-
sions of this section on the floor of the Senate indicate that it was conceived 
primarily as a remedy for individual United States citizens, especially con-
sumers. 1I8 
When the Clayton Act was under consideration, the House debates address-
ing the treble damages provisions reveal that these actions were conceived 
primarily as "opening the door to every man whenever he may be injured by 
those who violate the antitrust laws. "119 This type of universal language was 
used throughout the Clayton Act debates. 120 Such language presents a potent 
suggestion that the antitrust laws were intended to encompass foreign nations 
in the absence of explicit exclusionary language .. 
However, if the Sherman Act contemplated implicit protection of domestic 
individuals only, it is logical to conclude that the all inclusive language used in 
the Clayton Act debates was conveyed with a previously limited class in 
mind. l2I In 1871 a general interpretive statute was enacted by Congress. The 
statute provided that the word 'person' in future legislation "may extend and 
be applied to bodies politic and corporate .... "122 However, the following 
year Congress received a report from the commissioners appointed by the 
President of the United States to revise, simplify, arrange and consolidate all 
statutes of the United States. m 
The report criticized the statute of 1871 because it required draftsmen of 
statutes employing the word 'person' to additionally provide for the explicit 
exclusion of states and foreign governments. 12• The commissioners' recom-
mendation, therefore, was that the statute be modified so as to remove any 
117. Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, S 7, 26 Stat. 210. Section 7 reads as follows: 
Sec. 7. Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by any other per-
son or corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this 
act, may sue therefor in any circuit court ofthe United States in the district in which the 
defendant resides or is found, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall 
recover threefold the damage by him sustained, and the costs of suit, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee. 
118. 21 CONGo REC. 1767-1768 (1889) (remarks of Sen. George); See Brunswick Corporation 
V. Pueblo Bowl-Q-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 486 (1977). 
119. 51 CONGo REC. 9073 (1914) (emphasis added) (remarks of Congressman Webb). 
120. See, t.g., id. at 9079,9270,9414-9417,9466-9467,9487-9495, cited in Brunswick Corpora-
tion V. Pueblo Bowl-Q-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. at 486 n.l0. 
121. "Words having universal scope, such as 'Every contract in restraint of trade,' 'Every 
person who shall monopolize,' etc., will be taken as a matter of course to mean only every one 
subject to such legislation, not all that the legislator subsequently may be able to catch." American 
Banana, 213 U.S. at 357. 
122. Act of February 25,1871, ch. 71, S 2,16 Stat. 431. 
123. See Act of June 27, 1866, ch. 140, 14 Stat. 74. 
124. See I REVISION OF THE UNITED STATES STATUTES AS DRAFTED BY THE COMMISSIONERS 19 
(1872) (Revisors' Note). 
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reference to bodies politic. 125 This was done to ensure that the extension of the 
word 'person' in future legislation would not include such governments 
without explicit inclusion. 126 Congress adopted this recommendation. 127 The 
revised statute, with which the drafters of the Sherman Act were undoubtedly 
familiar, provided that "the word 'person' may apply and be extended to 
partnerships and corporations." 128 One contemporary commentary clearly 
manifested that the exclusion of foreign governments was an express intention 
of the provision. 129 
The choice of similar language in section 8 of the Sherman Act appears to 
exhibit a similar intent to exclude foreign governments. The drafters of the 
Clayton Act manifested the same purpose by adopting the same language that 
was used in the Sherman Act. This inference is clear since no language is 
found in the debates of the Clayton Act to suggest it was to expand the class to 
which the antitrust laws were applicable. 130 
It follows from this analysis that the language of the Clayton Act debates 
should be confined to the definitions utilized in the debates on the Sherman 
Act. In other words, the inclusive language used in the debates on the Clayton 
Act referred to the class specifically denoted by Congress in 1890 to be the 
beneficiaries of the Act. Approaching the problem in this manner, it becomes 
apparent that Congress, by discussing the Clayton Act in such broad and in-
clusive terms was not including foreign governments. Foreign powers do not 
belong to the 'universe' to which the phrases such as 'every man' refer. 
2. Transactions Having Minimal Impact upon U.S. Commerce Are Not 
Violations of the Antitrust Laws 
Statutes are construed by courts with reference to the circumstances existing 
at the time of enactment. 131 Since the statutory analysis is not assisted by the 
legislative history of the Clayton Act, a study of the legislative climate, 
manifested by the contemporaneous enactment ofthe Webb-Pomerene Act, is 
useful in this analysis. 132 The rule of law in existence in the early 1900s con-
125. /d. 
126. /d.; see also S III. A supra. 
127. S •• Act of June 22,1874,18 Stal. pI. 1,1092. 
128. S •• 1 U.S.C. S 1 (1976) (current version). 
129. S •• I NOTES ON THE REVISED STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES. 1874-1889, at 1 O· 
Gould & G. Tucker eds. 1889). 
130. Compare note 95 supra with S III.A supra. 
131. United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 411 (1962). 
132. Cj id. On the surface, W's. suggests that an interpretation by a 1916 Congress into what 
is a Sherman Act violation will not lend any creditable guidance to this analysis. Se. id. This case, 
however, can be easily distinguished. The Court stated that an interpretation of the Sherman Act 
by members of the 1914 Congress, whose proposed l.gislation is unsuccessful did not deserve any 
weight for purposes of construing the Sherman Act. First, only statements by proponents of the suc-
cessful bill will be used. Second, although attempts to extract from the legislative history what 
acts shall be considered a violation of the antitrust laws are being made, the Sherman Act is not 
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sidered voluntary restraints of trade reasonable, and therefore lawful, when no 
American interest was prejudiced by undue restraints of competition within 
the United States or obstructions in its export trade. 133 The argument that any 
voluntary restraint of trade by American competitors in marketing their goods 
abroad is a reasonable restraint of trade within the meaning of the antitrust 
laws was concisely stated in the form of a syllogism by Senator Culberson: 
1.) A voluntary restraint of trade, in order to be unreasonable 
within the meaning of the antitrust acts, must prejudice the public, 
i.e., American, interest. 134 
2.) No American interest is prejudiced when American corpora-
tions, who are competing in the domestic market in the purchase of 
raw materials, 'employment of labor, and the sale of products, 
eliminate competition voluntarily among themselves In the 
marketing of their goods in foreign countries. 135 
3.) Therefore, associations engaged solely In export trade, 
being construed, but rather the Clayton Act is being expounded with respect to what Congress, at 
the time of its enactment, pictured as a violation. In other words, the private treble damages 
remedy afforded in the Clayton Act should be read in light of what its Congress believed a viola-
tion of the antitrust laws to be. The bill as it was finally enacted in 1918 was substantially similar 
to the original draft. 
133. See Ammcan TobfJCco, 221 U.S. 106 (1911); United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 
268 (1927); United States v. Pacific & Arctic Railway & Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913). 
134. Even today, the test most frequently used to determine whether conduct outside the 
United States is subject to the U.S. antitrust laws is the 'affects test' as formulated by Judge 
Learned Hand in Aluminum ComfJIJny of America, 148 F.2d at 444. This test examines whether the 
defendant's conduct intended to and did affect U.S. markets. See, e.g., United States v. Min-
nesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp .. 947 (D. Mass. 1950); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., Inc., 
344 U.S. 280 (1952); see also S II. A supra. . 
135. In Standard Oil Co. v. tfnited States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), the Supreme Court adopted 
what is still known as the 'rule of reason' test, whereby only unreasonable restraints of trade are 
considered violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act. One of the clearest and most frequently 
cited statements of this test was delivered in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 
231 (1918): 
The true test oflegality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and 
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even 
destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the 
facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; the nature of the restraint 
and its effect, the actual or probable history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, 
the reason for adopting a particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, 
are all relevant facts. This is not because good intention will save an otherwise objec-
tionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the Court 
to interpret the facts and to predict the consequences. 
]d. at 238 (Brandeis, J.). 
However, "[tJhe circumstances of foreign trade may alter the incidence of what in the setting 
of domestic commerce would be a clear case of an unreasonable restraint of trade." Timken 
Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 605 (1951 )(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). This 
test, when applied in a foreign setting, leads to the determination that conduct not affecting 
American interests is legal under the antitrust laws. 
It should be noted that an attack upon the constitutionality of the Sherman Act based upon the 
vagueness of the 'rule ofreason' was defeated in Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913). 
\ 
f/I 
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regardless of the proportion of a given industry involved, are not il-
legal under the [ antitrust laws]. 136 [footnotes added]. 
165 
During the period of the debates on the Webb-Pomerene Act, there were 
serious doubts as to whether American corporations were prohibited under the 
antitrust laws from forming joint selling agencies (to conspire under the terms 
of the antitrust laws) in the export of goods. 137 Many lawyers believed they 
were not; but the doubt surrounding the issue was sufficient to restrain any 
such effort. 138 
A further, and possibly more significant, illustration of the jingoistic at-
titude embodied in the Webb-Pomerene Act and its contemporary legislation, 
is a statement by Congressman Webb in the House debates that "[he] would 
be willing that there should be a combination between anybody or anything 
for the purpose of capturing the trade of the world, if[ it does] not punish the 
people of the U.S. in doing it."139 The legislative atmosphere leaves little 
doubt about the scope of section 4 of the Clayton Act. 
In addition, the Federal Trade Commission corroborated these views in a 
report submitted to Congress on May 3, 1916.14° It did not believe that by the 
enactment of the antitrust laws, Congress intended to prevent American com-
petitors from freely engaging in export trade. 141 The Commission recom-
mended the enactment of declaratory and permissive legislation to remove the 
then present doubt as to the law and to definitively establish the legality of 
such cooperation. 142 
In this atmosphere, in both the enacting and enforcement branches of 
government, the Webb-Pomerene Act was passed. The Congressional intent 
could not be any more explicit: American exports were to be increased at no 
cost to competition within the United States, or its export trade, by 
withholding the benefits of competition among American corporations from 
foreigners. However, it cannot be stressed too lightly that the Webb-
Pomerene Act was not designed to lessen the force of the then existing an-
titrust laws.143 The antitrust laws are applicable not only within the United 
136. Montague, The Webb Bill and IheAntitrust Laws, 3 AM. BARA.J. 145, 162 n.28 [hereinafter 
cited as Montague). 
137. See J1izer, 434 U.S. at 323 n.l (Burger, J., dissenting). 
138. See 55 CONGo REC. 3564 (1917) (remarks of Congressman Webb); H.R. REP. No. 50, 
65th Cong., lst Sess. 3 (1917). 
139. 55 CONGo REC. 3580 (1917) (remarks of Congressman Webb). 
140. 53 CONGo REC. 7285 (1916). 
141. I FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT ON COOPERATION IN AMERICAN EXPORT 
TRADE 9 (1965). 
142. !d. at 379. 
143. The Webb-Pomerene Act, S 2,15 U.S.C. S 62 (1976), provides that it shall be illegal for 
a corporation to "enter into any agreement, understanding, or conspiracy, or do any act which 
artificially or intentionally enhances or depresses prices within the United States of commodities 
of the class exported by such association, or which substantially lessens competition within the 
United States or otherwise restrains trade therein." [d. 
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States, but their fullest operation is also extended to export associations insofar 
as they restrain trade within the United States or force U.S. exporters to in-
voluntarily refrain from competing. IH However, there should be "no opera-
tion whatsoever of any of the antitrust laws against such technical restraints of 
trade outside the United States as result when U.S. exporters voluntarily com-
bine and cease to compete with one another. "1f5 Thus, it is clear that the Sher-
man and Clayton Acts are concerned only with those practices resulting in 
anti-competitive conduct in the U.S. export, import or domestic markets. 
Although the antitrust laws are concerned with foreign commerce, 146 it is only 
in the terms of American foreign commerce. Thus, this evidence does not sup~ 
port the conclusion reached in Pfizer. 
As appears from this brief discussion, the antitrust laws do not contemplate 
the inclusion of foreigners in the absence of a specific exception or adverse ef-
fect upon U.S. trade. 147 The inclusion of foreign sovereigns within the ambit 
of 'any person' would be in direct conflict with the meaning and purpose of 
the antitrust laws. Obviously, Congress would not, and in fact could not, 
withhold liability for conduct impairing the business or property of a foreign 
government on the one hand, but then grant the government standing to sue 
on the other, when it is clear that there would be no claim upon which relief 
might be granted. 14s 
144. Th~ Webb-Pomerene Act maintains that it shall not be a violation of the antitrust laws to 
engage in a technical restraint" provided such association, agreement, or act is not in restraint of 
trade within the United States, and is not in restraint of the export trade of any domestic com-
petitor of such association." /d. 
145. Montague, supra note 113, at 156. 
146. See notes 66-68 and accompanying text supra. 
147. The Sherman Act is not intended to protect foreign consumers against monopoly in their 
home markets. See IV.B supra. Instead, it should encourage the competitive allocation of 
American resources between foreign and domestic markets. A change in price through the nor-
mal mechanism of supply and demand should not be contemplated as creating an adverse result. 
The focus of attention should be placed upon the competition between the domestic market and ex-
port trade, not, in this limited respect, within each. 
Whether price changes occur as the result of combinations or normal market forces, they will 
almost invariably accompany changes in the volume of export trade. This change could be either 
temporary or permanent. In a competitive market if the price of the commodity increases, but the 
cost of production remains constant, i.e., the profit for unit of output increases, firms will be in-
duced to enter the industry forcing an increase in production and a reduction in price. See generally 
P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS chs. 23 & 24 (10th ed. 1976). However, if the commodity requires a 
scarce material, a price change will tend to be of a more permanent nature. But the same type of 
change, although different in degree, will occur regardless of whether the increase in exports was 
due to export combinations or to the normal responses of a competitive market. Jones, Extrater-
ritoriality in U. S. Antitrust: An International "Hot Polato, " 11 INT'L LAW. 415, 424 (1977) ("The case 
law establishes that the effect on United States commerce must be direct, not just a collateral or 
after effect' '); see Rahl, Foreign Commerce Jurisdiction of the American Antitrust Laws, 43 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 521 (1974). . 
When trade between the two markets is competitive and prices are permitted to adjust 
themselves, changes of this nature cannot be said to unreasonably restrain trade. 
148. Foreign governments, in order to have standing under the Clayton Act, must have suf-
i 
... 
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3. Suits by Foreign Governments Are Not Necessary for the Enforcement of 
the Antitrust Laws 
The final argument espoused by the Pfizer Court in support of its conclusion 
is that an exclusion of foreign governments from the word 'person' lessens the 
deterrent effect of treble damages.1+9 
The purposes of the treble damages remedy are to provide compensation to 
victims of an antitrust violation and to supplement the federal government's 
limited enforcement capacity with private suits so as to deter future 
violations. 150 The issue here is not simply whether a treble damages action by 
a foreign government is capable of compensating victims and deterring future 
violations of the antitrust laws, for it is clear that any action, in and of itself, 
has this potential. But the question of whether these actions actually effectuate 
the Congressional purposes of the antitrust laws in any significant manner re-
mains unclear. As discussed supra, 151 the interests of a foreign government are 
not among those which Congress sought to protect in the antitrust laws. Fur-
thermore, the Supreme Court has held that section 4 essentially is a remedial 
provision. ls2 Although it plays an important role in deterring potential 
violators, it is, nevertheless, designed primarily as a remedy for the kind of in-
jury Congress sought to prevent. IS3 
With this in mind, it becomes evident that the allowance of a treble damages 
remedy to a foreign government wiIl not in any way fulflll the aim of the an-
titrust laws, i.t., the compensation for injuries to U.S. interests. However, it 
still remains to be seen whether Congress could have intended a treble damage 
suit by a foreign government to serve as a deterrent. Section 4 of the Clayton 
Act is designed to deter prohibited conduct by giving victims of antitrust viola-
tions incentive to bring suit. Punitive damages and attorney fees are author-
ized in order to ensure the effectiveness of the remedy, i. t., to counterbalance 
"the difficulty of maintaining a private suit against a combination such as is 
described." 154 The inference to be drawn is clear: the treble damages remedy 
is not the deterrent, rather the maintenance of an antitrust action is. This in-
ference is the primary reason for the distinction between the United States 
fered the type of injury the antitrust laws were intended to prevent, i. t., harm to U. S. interests. 
Stt Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. at 489. 
149. l1izer;434 U.S. at 315. 
150. See, t.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 265-66 (1946); Zenith 
Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31 (1969); Perma Life Mufflers, 
Inc. v. In!,1 Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968). 
151. Stt S III.B.l supra. 
152. Remedies are, by definition, reserved for redress of the kind of injury which a statute is 
designed to prevent. Stt Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. at 484-89. Stt also 
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972). 
153. /d. 
154. Stt 21 CONGo REC. 2456 (1890). 
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and private entities since presumably greater resources are available to the 
former in its pursuit oflegal actions. 155 This same presumption, no doubt, ap-
plies to foreign governments as well. 
Furthermore, it is improbable that Congress would have considered 
assistance from a foreign government in the enforcement of U. S. laws an ap-
propriate aim, especially in light of the anti-competitive principles espoused 
by many of those countries. 156 However, Pfizer suggests that foreign govern-
ments acting in a proprietary capacity should be accorded the same rights and 
liabilities as foreign corporations, especially government controlled corpora-
tions. 157 
The inclusion of foreign corporations within the statutory definition of 'per-
son' in section 4 merely reflects their susceptibility to suit at the time of enact-
ment of both the Sherman and Clayton ActS. 158 However, foreign govern-
ments were immune from suit, even when acting in a commercial capacity. 159 
A foreign corporation was given the benefits of the antitrust laws apparently 
because it was subject to its burden. 160 
In 1890, Congress made a distinction between foreign governments and 
foreign corporations and it continues to perceive such a distinction. When the 
Sherman Act was enacted, the treble damages remedy was often characterized 
as a penalty. 161 Congress, with the passage of the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act, still recognized the special status of a foreign government. 162 
This Act provides that a foreign sovereign, even when acting in a commercial 
155. This difference in treatment is a recognition of the difference in the position of the 
United States and of 'persons' in this connection. Both may recover their actual 
damages. The damages of 'persons' are trebled so that private persons will be en-
couraged to bring actions which, though brought to enforce a private claim, will 
nonetheless serve the public interest in the enforcement of the antitrust laws. 
S. REP. No. 619, 84th Cong., lst Sess. 3, reprinted in [1955) U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2328, 
2330. 
156. "The notion that we should extend even to collectivist socialist states the benefit of our 
antitrust laws, while they are actively trying to destroy the whole system of free enterprise, is a 
strange view to be held by our courts." S. REP. No. 94-934, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1978). 
157. Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 313. 
158. See id. at 322 (Burger, J., dissenting). While this differential with respect to the suscep-
tibility to suit was relevant at the time of enactment, subsequent decisions have tended to ignore 
this distinction. See, e.g., Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1941); Parker V. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) 
(states not amenable to suits for treble damages). 
159. At the time of the passage of both the Sherman and Clayton Acts, foreign sovereigns, 
even when acting in a commercial capacity, were immune from suits in the United States. See The 
Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812); Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 
(1943). 
160. Cj Evans, 316 U.S. at 163: "If the word 'person' is to include a State as a plaintiff, it 
must equally include a State as a defendant or the language used is meaningless." /d. (Roberts, 
J., dissenting). 
161. See 21 CONGo REC. 1765, 1767, 3146 (1890) (remarks of Senators George & Hoar, respec-
tively). 
162. 28 U.S.C. H 1602-1611 (1976). 
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capacity, shall not be liable for punitive damages even though its agency or in-
strumentality may be so liable. 163 The intent of Congress in 1890 and again in 
1915 is obvious: the lack of any consideration of the status of a foreign govern-
ment under the antitrust laws indicated that they were not entitled to the 
remedies under these laws. Despite this, the Pfizer Court felt compelled to 
allow suits by a foreign government as a result of the decision in Evans. 
C. Evans and Cooper Do Not Dictate the Result in Pfizer 
In the purported absence of any legislative language or history, the Pfizer 
Court attempted to justify its expansive reading of 'person' by reference to 
Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Evans which granted the State of Georgia and 
all other domestic states the right to sue for treble damages. 16t The Court 
found the analogy of foreign nations to that of the states with respect to the in-
congruity of leaving the states without any remedy whatsoever under the an-
titrust laws dispositive.1 65 
Unquestionably, confined to the explicit provisions of the antitrust laws, a 
foreign nation's remedies are comparable to those of a state - they are vir-
tually nonexistent. However, as Justice Berger's dissent in Pfizer correctly 
notes: "[t]he limited scope ofthe inquiry in Evans precludes consideration of 
the manifold and patently obvious respects in which foreign nations and our 
own domestic states differ - cogent differences bearing on the question under 
consideration here, though obviously not at all on the Court's inquiry in 
Evans. "166 
Initially, it is necessary to note that the comparison of the two political en-
tities is important only if it can be shown that Congress, by enacting the Sher-
man and Clayton Acts, intended them to be the recipients of the same 
remedies against anti-competitive conduct. The denial of a treble damages 
remedy to domestic states would, as the Evans Court noted,I67 essentially 
deprive U. S. citizens, the beneficiaries of state action, of the protection man-
dated by the antitrust laws. But the analogy to Evans used in Pfizer is not only 
an intolerable strain on the literal language of the antitrust laws, but an insup-
portable amplification of the legislative histories as well. As has been noted,168 
the legislative histories of the various antitrust laws lend no support, and in 
163. As to·any claim for relief with respect to which a foreign state is not entitled to im-
munity ... the foreign state shall be liable in the same manner and to the same ex-
tent as a private individual under like circumstances; but a foreign state except for 
an agency or instrumentality thereof shall not be liable for punitive damages. 
[d. S 1606. 
164. Pjiur, 434 U.S. at 318; see EV<lns, 316 U.S. at 164. 
165. Pjiur, 434 U.S. at 318. 
166. Id. at 326 (Burger, J., dissenting). 
167. EV<lns, 316 U.S. at 162. 
168. See SIll. B supra. 
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many instances contradict the supposition that states and foreign nations are 
so essentially alike as to warrant similar treatment under the antitrust laws. 169 
Second, the Supreme Court's acceptance of the argument that a foreign na-
tion, absent a treble damages remedy, would be denied its only weapon to 
deter anti-competitive conduct by American corporations is inaccurate. 17O 
This argument is true only with respect to remedies under the laws of the 
United States. Unlike domestic states, whose actions are confined by the 
Commerce171 and Supremacy Clauses,172 a foreign sovereign may, if it so 
desires, enact and enforce its own comprehensive antitrust laws to satisfy its 
needs.u' In fact, "[ 0 Jne need look no further than the laws of respondents In-
169. The Pfizer Court could not have granted foreign nations the treble damages remedy 
without this presupposition. See Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 318. 
170. In fact, the antitrust laws and enforcement programs various foreign nations have 
adopted [or could adopt] may offer a more direct means for redressing unreasonable 
trade restraints which have their primary impact on the residents of those jurisdic-
tions, but have no significant impact on United States consumer interests or export 
opportunities. 
Antitrust Guide, supra note 30, at 154. 
171. U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, d. 3. 
172. Id. art. VI, S 2. 
173. Indeed, many countries either individually or in connection with an association of coun-
tries do have comprehensive antitrust laws. India, for example, enacted a statute in 1969 to 
regulate monopolies and restrictive trade practices. Inida Monopolies & Restrictive Trade Prac-
tices Act, 1969, 14 INDIA A.I.R. MANUAL 657 (1972), reprinted in Singh, The CommerciIJl Laws of 
IndiIJ, in III DIGEST OF COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE WORLD (G. Kahlik ed. 1979). The main pro-
visions of the Act are -
I) To regulate expansion, mergers and amalgamations, and the appointment of direc-
tors in respect of "dominant" undertakings having assets ofRs. 10 million or more and 
of undertakings, having assets of more than Rs. 200 million in value; 
2) To regulate all new undertakings which would become inter-connected u~dertakirigs 
of such existing undertakings and the total assets of which exceed Rs. 200 millhn; 
3) To control and prohibit such monopolistic and restrictive trade practices as are 
found to be prejudicial to the public interest. 
Id. For a complete analysis of the Act, see id. 
Another good example is the Federal Republic of Germany, which filed an amicus brief on 
behalf of Respondents. The German statute' Against Restraints of Trade' stresses the impor-
tance of domestic commerce as do the U.S. antitrust laws. Neugassung des gesetzes gegen Wet-
tewerbsbeshrankungen (Act Against Restraints of Competition), April 10, 1974, [1974] BGBI. I 
869 (W. Ger.). The provisions of this statute suggest that the attitude towards foreign trade is 
similar to the views espoused in the legislative history of the Webb-Pomerene Act. Set r.otes 
114-24 supra and accompanying text. Sections 1(1), 6(1) & 98(2) of the German Act read as 
follows: 
S 1( 1) Agreements made for a common purpose by enterprises of associations of enter-
prises and decisions of associations of enterprises shall be of no effect, insofar as they are 
likely to influence, by restraining competition, production or market conditions with 
respect to trade in goods or commercial services. This shall apply only insofar as this 
Act does not provide otherwise. 
BGBI.I 869, reprinted in Germany, Act Against Rts/raints of Compnition, in 1 GUIDE TO LEGISLATION 
ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES S 1.0 (O.E.C.D. ed. 1979). 
S 6(1) Section 1 shall not apply to agreements and decisions which serve to protect and 
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dia and the Philippines for evidence that such remedies are possessed by 
foreign nations." I" 
Finally, there are obvious and dramatic differences in terms of coercive 
economic power and political interest which distinguish the states of the 
United States from foreign sovereigns. Anti-competitive practices existing 
within foreign countries, such as price fixing and boycotts by the Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),175 were the primary reasons for 
the enactment of the Webb-Pomerene Act .. This statute was designed to 
remove any doubt as to the legality of U.S. firms cooperating to gain entrance 
into and possible dominance of foreign markets. 176 It is unreasonable to 
presume that Congress contemplated protection of a foreign nation from anti-
competitive conduct even when that nation does not support a competitive 
ideology. 177 
!d. 
to promote exports, insofar as they are limited to regulation of competition in markets 
outside the area to which this Act applies. 
S 98(2) This Act shall apply to all restraints of competition which have effect in the area 
in which this Act applies, even if they result from acts done outside such area. 
!d. As can be seen, the Act applies to any restraint of competition regardless of its origin so long 
as it has an effect on domestic markets. 
What constitutes an "effect in the area in which this Act applies" has not yet been final-
ly clarified. The prevailing view is that this term includes only direct effects on the com-
petitive process or on the economic freedom of enterprises on domestic markets, not 
however, other indirect economic effects. 
Id. S 2.0 at 19. 
Su REHBINDER. EXTRATERRITORlALE WIRKUNGEN DES DEUTSCHEN KARTELLRECHTS. 112-53 
(1965); Judgment of July 12, 1973, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., (1973) BGHZ 203, wherein it 
was held that Section 98(2) ofthe Act was not applicable to export cartels when they are found not 
to have an effect on the domestic market. Markert, Recent Developmm/s in German Antitrust Law, 43 
FORDHAM L. REV. 697 (1975). 
The best example of a foreign statute made applicable to American corporations is the Com-
mon Market's Treaty of Rome, specifically Articles 85-99 establishing the European Economic 
Community. Treaty of Rome, March 25, 1957, arts. 85-99, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (1957). S •• , •. g., 
Europenballage Corp. & Continental Can Co. v. Commission of European Communities, (1973) 
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 215, 242, 12 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 199, 222 (1973); Institute 
Chemioterapico Italiano SpA & Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Commission of the European 
Communities, [1974) E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 223, 13 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 309 (1974). 
174. Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 327 (Burger,J., dissenting). 
175. For an excellent analysis of the Arab boycott under both international law and the U.S: 
antitrust laws, see CONFERENCE ON TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC BOYCOITS & COERCION (Mer-
sky & Paperseds. 1976). 
On December 29, 1978 the International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers 
(lAM) filed a complaint against OPEC and its members individually alleging a price fixing con-
tract, combination and conspiracy. International Machine and Aerospace Workers v. Organiza-
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries, No. 78-5012 (C. D. Cal., filed Dec. 29, 1978). The case 
was dismissed, but the Court gave both parties two months in which the lAM was to amend its 
complaint and OPEC was to more fully develop its sovereign immunity argument. On the second 
time around, the case was again dismissed, 48 U.S.L.W. 2257 (1979). 
176. See S IV.B.2 supra. 
177. A foreign nation's anticompetitive practices are not, ipso facto, a bar to a treble damage 
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Viewed in this light, the considerations necessary to make an informed 
determination in Pfizer were drastically different than those facing Justice 
Frankfurter in Evans. The inference to be drawn from the Court's analysis in 
Pfizer is unmistakable: a "hard and fast rule of inclusion" has been substituted 
for the "hard and fast rule of exclusion" avoided by the Court in both Cooper 
and Evans. 178 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Comment has examined Pfizer in light of the purpose, subject matter, 
context and legislative history of U.S. antitrust laws as well as the Court's 
reliance on two prior cases that involved the right of a sovereign to treble 
damages. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the sole issue to be decided 
in Pfizer was one of statutory interpretation, i. t., are foreign sovereigns 'per-
sons' within section 4 of the Clayton Act.179 Even though the Court recog-
nized no statutory provision nor legislative history directed towards this issue, 
the Court responded in the affirmative. 180 The Court supported its opinion by 
relying upon the purpose that Congress should have enacted or would have 
had it recognized the problem in 1890.181 
suit. In Perma Life Muffiers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968), the Court 
was presented with the question of whether the plaintiffs participation in a related activity which 
violated the antitrust laws precluded recovery under Section 4 of the Clayton Act. It was held that 
"the doctrine of in pari delicto, with its complex scope, contents, and effects is not to be recognized 
as a defense to an antitrust action." /d. at 140. The Court did not decide, however, whether a 
plaintiff who had "truly complete involvement and participation in a monopolistic 
scheme ... wholly apart from the idea of in pan' delicto would be barred from suit. " /d. Recently, 
it was decided by the Ninth Circuit that recovery would be barred only when the antitrust viola-
tion would not have occurred but for the plaintiffs participation. Javelin Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 
546 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1976), em. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977). 
Unrelated antitrust violations have long been held not to bar the plaintiff from monetary relief, 
See Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951); if. Heldman v. 
United States Lawn Tennis Ass'n, 354 F.Supp. 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Credit Bureau Reports, 
Inc. v. Retail Credit Company, 358 F.Supp. 780 (S.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd, 476 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 
1973). 
178. "Implicit in the majority opinion is the premise that the real question is whether, given 
the purpose of the Act, it can be said that other aids to construction counteract the presumptive 
inclusion." Houser & Rigler, Antitrust and the Foreign Govemmmt Trader: The Impact of fYjztT, Inc. v. 
Govemmmtof India, 10 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 719, 736 (1978). 
179. Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 312. 
180. /d. at 320. 
181. Cj Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1947). 
Frankfurter remarks that "the purpose which the Court must effectuate is not that which Con-
gress should have enacted or would have. It is that which it did enact, however inaptly, because it 
may fairly be said to be imbedded in the statute, even if the specific manifestation is not thought 
of .... " Id. at 539. Cj Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1941) (Roberts,J., dissenting). "It is not our func-
tion to speculate as to what Congress probably intended by the words it used, or to enforce the 
supposed policy of the Act by adding a provision which Congress might have incorporated but 
omitted." /d. at 164. 
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The decision represents an "undisguised exercise of legislative 
power . . . not only plainly at odds with the language of the statute but also 
with the legitimate history and precedents of(the Supreme Court]. "182 In this 
regard, it can be said that the Supreme Court has violated its own rules on 
judicial restraint in expanding the scope of the Clayton Act beyond the 
statutory language without the clear expression of Congressional intent. 18! 
Steven D. Goldberg 
182. Pfizer, 434 U.S. at 320 (Burger, J., dissenting). 
183. See Illinois Brick v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Corp. Paving Co., 
419 U.S. 186 (1974); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1971). In this connection it 
must be noted that Congress has been much more receptive to legislatively expanding a narrow 
interpretation of the antitrust laws by the Supreme Court than to narrowing an expansive 
reading. In fact, while Congress has amended the antitrust laws a number of times to overrule or 
modify a narrow holding by the Supreme Court, see notes 4, 8, 49 &: 50 SIIJmI, it hu never criti-
cized the Court for expanding the rights and remedies available under the antitrust Iawi. 
